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I. CONTEXT
This paper begins with a fairly obvious comparison of two texts.
My hope, however, is that out of  this comparison a supplement will
emerge—an excrescence that is contained by neither and that exposes the
limits of both. The texts under consideration are Alain Badiou's Saint
Paul: The Foundation of Universalism and Giorgio Agamben's The Time
that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. These two
works have taken center stage in a recent, and until recently largely un-
predictable, Pauline revival among social and legal theorists. Neither
author makes any claim to being a Paul expert, and neither, it should be
made clear at the outset, do I. I  am an interested amateur at best; but
what I take from Badiou and Agamben is less a new erudition with re-
spect to Biblical exegesis, than a new—sometimes exhilarating, some-
times perplexing—effort to think through the problem of "political the-
ology."
t Charles Barbour is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Western Sydney. H e works on
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Political theology is a term coined, to the best of my knowledge, by
Mikhail Bakunin. Bakunin used the term in the pejorative sense, after
the manner of the Left Hegelians of the Vormarz—the period in German
history "before March," or before the Berlin riots of March 1848 that
signaled the beginning of the 1848 revolution. By  "political theology,"
Balcunin meant any effort to understand the human relations in regres-
sively theological or religious terms. Balcunin's term "political theol-
ogy" was adopted and utterly transformed a few generations after the
Vormiirz by the archconservative jurist Carl Schmitt, whose use of it was
anything but pejorative. Schmitt's thesis concerning political theology is
once again well known today, but it bears repeating nonetheless: "Ail
significant concepts of the modern, theory of the state," Schmitt declares,
"are secularized theological concepts."' For  Schmitt, the whole history
of politics and law can be understood in relation to, and read indirectly
through, the history o f  metaphysical systems. Understood correctly,
Schmitt proposes, theological disputes should be seen, not as empty
speculation about the ineffable mysteries of life, but as pitched battles
and hand-to-hand combat over the most basic, and most materially sig-
nificant, aspects of_ -legal and political order. Moreover, whether we
know it or pot, when w
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incorporate a 'collection of tropes that are derived from and ultimately
compreh nded by, theological disputation.
Thus, to recall two of Schmitt's favorite examples, the modern con-
cept of political sovereignty is a transformed and disguised concept of
God, and the modem
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and disguised concept of the Miracle. Front Schmitt's perspective, T, then,
the notion that we might be able to construct a purely secular understand-
ing of politics and law---something that grew up among the civil phi-
losophers o f  the seventeenth century and took root during the eight-
eenth—is not an Enlightenment advance over previously theological ap-
proaches to these issues. O n the contrary, secular political thought con-
sists largely of a certain forgetfulness of its own conditions, or a blind-
ness towards the theological. principles that i
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- - - Whether or not aimit t 's  diagnosis of political modernity is valid,
there certainly seems to have been a revival of "political theology" in our
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1 SCHMITT, POIATICAL TiIEGLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 26 (George Schwab trdas., Univ. of Chicago Press 2006)(1923).
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tionship between politics and theology, and even the political implica-
tions of Paul's letters, I suspect that it is only recently that so many of us
have chosen to read them. O r  at least, it is only recently that a certain
kind of scholar has chosen to read them. I  don't want to speak for every-
one, but I think I can say with some assurance that if a young student had
come into a seminar a decade ago when I was starting graduate school—
after the eras of deconstruction, new historicism, cultural studies, post-
colonialism, and queer theory—and said they were interested in Saint
Paul, and especially Paul's articulation o f  a universal and messianic
truth, they would have been met with either dumbfounded silence or vi-
cious intellectual assassination.
On the other hand, and with the benefit of retrospect, I guess we
might have seen it coming: this return to theology among scholars in the
postmodern world. For  after we spent so much energy dismantling the
pretensions of Enlightenment reason, undermining the rational subject,
and exposing the flimsy nature of so-called neutral, objective, or scien-
tific truth, and after so many of our philosophers had noted that the only
knowledge of interest is knowledge of the incommensurable, the unde-
cidable, or even the sublime, one wonders where else we might have
turned if  not to theology. For, if  nothing else, theology gives us a fairly
consistent language for talking about our relationship with the unknow-
able—what cannot be contained in any system, and yet makes every such
system possible.
Either way, however we got here, here we are in an age when it
makes sense for great thinkers to speak confidently about political theol-
ogy, and to read with passionate intensity the epistles of Saint Paul. So
"we must begin wherever we are,"
2 a s  D e r r i d a  
s a y s ,  
q u o t i n g  
N i e t z s c
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And this is where we happen to be. Time, therefore, to begin.
INTRODUCTION
Both Badiou's and Agamben's interpretations of Paul seek to over-
turn a long history of scholarship that treats Paul as the institutionaliza-
tion or pragmatic corruption of Christ's essentially liberating and revolu-
tionary message—a reading that reached its  apex, perhaps, w ith
Nietzsche, especially "Section 42" of The Anti-Christ, which is blistering
in its condemnation of Paul. Against this line of thought, both Badiou
and Agamben prefer to consider Paul, not as a believer in Christ the per-
son, but as an apostle of the Christ-event, and specifically Christ's death
and resurrection.
1  JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 162 (Gayatri Spivak trans., The Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1998)(1967).
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Thus, they maintain that Paul's letters can and should be read inde-
pendently of the Gospels, which tell the story of the life of a man who
was the Son of God. I n  a certain sense, for both Badiou and Agamben,
the life of Christ, and the whole familiar debate over the historical Jesus
that raged throughout the nineteenth century and continues to this day, is
more or less irrelevant. Both treat Paul as someone who speaks, not of
the life of another man, but of a singular experience of his own. Both
read Paul, not as someone who sought to institutionalize a miraculous
event in a Church, but as someone who uses the Christ-event to articulate
a new philosophy, or more accurately a new political understanding of
being with ourselves and with others in the world—that is to say, in this
world, not a world hereafter.
More germane to the topic of  this conference, both Badiou and
Agamben are interested in Paul as an antinomial thinker, or as someone
who wants to transform entirely his reader's relationship with the law.
And finally, for both Badiou and Agamben, Paul's work is thoroughly
relevant to our own relationship with the law today. For both Badiou and
Agamben, it is largely Paul's attack on the law that makes his work rele-
vant.
On the other hand, their agreements aside, the basic difference be-
tween Badiou and Agamben can be summed up quite perspicuously: For
Badiou, Paul's epistles or letters constitute "the foundation of universal-
ism," whereas for Agamben, they represent "the fundamental messianic
text" in our intellectual tradition. That is to say, for Badiou, Paul is a
political militant, or one who states axiomatic, universal political truths
irrespective of all circulating opinions and interests. For  Agamben, on
the other hand, Paul is much more a philosopher of time and someone
who understands politics, less in terms of the statement of truths, than in
the experiences of hope and redemption.
What I would like to do now is, perhaps, a little bit pedantic, and I
apologize for that. Nonetheless it is, I think, necessary. I n  Parts III and
IV, I  will summarize in very broad terms the details of  Badiou's and
Agamben's respective appropriations o f  Paul. With in  each o f  these
Parts, I  will speak a little bit about the implications of  these various
claims for contemporary legal theory—at least as I understand it, and I
am no expert. Finally , in Part V. I  will discuss briefly an alternative
reading of Paul, one provided by Hannah Arendt, which, while far less
fashionable, might have something important to contribute to this con-
versation.
For the sake of clarity, and so I don't lose my audience too quickly,
I will explain each of these points briefly: First, Badiou treats Paul as a
source for a new or renewed political militancy—one based on universal,
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axiomatic truths or what he calls "truth-events" rather than struggles over
a plurality of opinions, identities, or subject positions. I n  comparison,
Agamben reads Paul as a theorist of time, and locates him in a tradition
of Jewish mysticism that culminates in the work of Walter Benjamin. In
both Parts III and IV, regarding the ways in which Badiou's and Agam-
ben's respective interpretations of Paul relate to contemporary legal the-
ory, I argue that they both use Paul to reject the notion that law is a nec-
essary condition of human social relations, or that law constitutes social
order. To put matters far too crudely, they both use Paul to suggest that
law is dispensable, and that it is possible to image a social world or so-
cial relations without law. Finally, we have Arendt's occasional reading
of Paul. Arendt proposes that Paul invents the concept of the will—the
difference between what I want to do and what I actually do. She further
proposes that, while this distinction is of  crucial importance in private
life, it is of less importance in public life. Thus, for Arendt, Paul's rejec-
tion of the law is best understood as a mode of living with ourselves, and
doesn't really work as a way o f  living with others—the latter being
something for which we need law.
When I break my argument down like this, I  feel as though my
point becomes obvious. But  by "obvious," I mean the word in the pre-
cise etymological sense of something that is ob via, something that is
"against" or "in" the "way." Regardless, just because it is obvious does
not mean that it is false. And, the more I think about it, the more I think
all I want to do in this paper is attach a thin, wispy tether between what is
obvious—what is in the way—and what is true.
III. BADIOU'S UNIVERSALISM
A. Badiou and the Event
Let's start, then, with Alain Badiou. I  don't know how many peo-
ple are familiar with Badiou's work, but his seminal text, his magnum
opus really, is a colossal book called Being and Event. I  won't pretend to
have time to do anything like justice to its argument. Suffice to say, that
in Being and Event, Badiou seeks to construct an entirely new ontol-
ogy—one based on mathematics and set theory rather than semiotics,
culture, or language.
Basically, Badiou proposes that existence is shot through by singu-
lar events that bear no relationship with other elements of reality, but
emerge spontaneously, as it were, out of the void. Although utterly dis-
crete and non-relational, events rely nonetheless on militant subjects who
attach themselves to those events, or more accurately, who are created
along with them, and who maintain what Badiou calls a certain "fidelity"
284 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:279
to them. To be struck by an event, to be swept up in its sudden appear-
ance, is also to reject everything that would allow you to make sense of it
from a particular perspective. I t  is to reject what Badiou calls "cornmu-
nitarian particularism," and, in simple terms, to be born anew.
Two things are perhaps becoming apparent: First, the reason for
Badiou's fascination with Paul, who, through his famous experience on
the road to Damascus, is swept up in the Christ-event; and second, Ba-
diou's contempt for pluralism or the politics of identity and difference,
and everything that was so well established by the field called "cultural
studies." When I say that Badiou has "contempt" for pluralism, I  am
using my words advisedly, even sparingly. Badiou thinks of  cultural
studies—or what he calls "culturalist ideology"—as an "extreme" rela-
tivism that renders "equivalent" statements of truth on the one hand, and
"obscurantist and symbolically trivial apparatuses"
3 o n  t h e  o t h e r .  
H e
believes that the pluralistic celebration of cultural identity and the pro-
duction of new capitalist markets are completely symbiotic, "perfectly
intertwined"' processes.
So we know what Badiou is against. Let's  explore a little bit just
what he supports, or what he proposes as an alternative to the politics of
modem pluralism. And  let's do that by addressing his book on Saint
Paul. Badiou reads Paul, not as a father of Roman Christendom, but as
"a subjective figure o f  primary importance," "a poet-thinker o f  the
event," and a "militant figure" who can contribute to what Badiou calls
"a widespread search for a new militant figure" today.
5 The problem Badiou sets before himself in his book on Saint Paul is
linking the theme of subjective freedom with that of a subject subordi-
nated or utterly faithful to an event that cannot be predicted, contained,
or reduced to calculable knowledge in any fashion. I t  is a question of
what Badiou calls a "singular universal," an event that addresses a uni-
versal truth the universality of which can exist only to the extent that a
singular subject is interpellated by it and publicly declares it. " A  truth
procedure is only universal," Badiou writes, "insofar as it is supported, at
that point through which it indexes the real, by an immediate subjective
recognition of its singularity."
6 W h a t  
B a d i o u  
m e a n s  
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s a l "  
h e r
e
is more than a little unusual and thus requires some explanation. The
universality of a truth-event does not rely on knowledge that can verify it
3. ALAIN BADIOU, SAINT PAUL: THE FOUNDATION OF UNIVERSALISM 6 (Ray Brassier trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1997).
4. M at 10.
5.M  at 1-2.
6.M  at 22.
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in an objective fashion. Indeed, it is a truth-event precisely to the extent
that it breaks with all forms of established knowledge and all established
modes of the law. Therefore, its universality paradoxically depends on a
singular subject who is willing to renounce within her or him self all pre-
vious markers of identity, all, as Badiou calls them, "communitarian par-
ticularisms," all structural or political "interests" and "opinions," in the
name of fidelity to the event itself.
Badiou therefore sketches out two elements o f  a truth-event or
truth-procedure: (1) "[E]very truth procedure breaks with the axiomatic
principle that governs the situation and organizes its repetitive series," or
breaks with established knowledge; and, for the same reason, (2) a truth
procedure "cannot take root in the element of identity. For  if  it is true
that every truth erupts as singular, its singularity is immediately univer-
salizable."
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universal to the extent that it is an axiomatic, unquestionable truth that
requires no verification, and cannot be ensnared within the logic of any
particular situation. I t  is singular to the extent that it must be articulated
by a subject who is radically disinterested in their own location within a
situation, or who has nothing to gain, and perhaps much to lose, by de-
claring it.
B. Badiou and Legal Theory
I know this all sounds a little strange, but I think Badiou's principle
claims—at least as they relate to theories of the law—can be understood
quite simply if  we focus on two elements of his reading of Paul: (1) his
interpretation of Paul's doctrine of grace, which he calls "senseless su-
perabundance"; and (2) his broad outline of what he calls "the four dis-
courses," or four different ways of relating to the law: the Jewish, the
Greek, the obscurantist, and, from Badiou's perspective at least, the
properly Christian.
For Badiou, Paul's doctrine of grace or elpsis is crucial to under-
standing his antinomialism. I f  law is understood in terms of  nomos,
which is to say sharing, allotment, and measure, or a kind of parceling
out of established goods, the Christ-event represents for Paul the end of
any such distributive conception of justice. "For  Paul," Badiou main-
tains, "the Christ-event is heterogeneous to the law, pure excess over
every prescription, grace without concept or appropriate right."
8 I  a m  n o tsure that Badiou would put it this way, but for our purposes we might say
that Christ's sacrifice, in its overwhelming pointlessness, or its over-
7. M at 11.
8. M at 57.
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whelming one-sidedness, wipes clean the need for any further sacrifices,
or any future effort to balance our relationship with either God or one
another. I t  is absolute grace, an absolute gift, and as such it renders im-
mediately irrelevant the established or recognizable differences between
subjects and addresses or calls out to each subject in their utterly disin-
terested singularity.
Law is, as Badiou puts it, "the cipher of finitude"
9 a n d  h e n c e  
d e a t h .
It is what allows us to distribute what we already have or what is avail-
able within a finite situation. Grace, on the other hand, is the gift of the
infinite I t  need not be distributed among us as a finite good, as it is
available to each one of us as a singular individual in infinite measure. I t
"is not strained," it is not limited, but "droppeth as the gentle rain from
heaven"









































To further explain Paul's antinomial proclamation, Badiou traces
out what he calls "four discourses" operative in the epistles—four poten-
tial "regimes of discourse" or "subjective dispositions."
I2 T h e  J e w i s hdiscourse is that of "the prophet" and "the sign," or what legal theorists
call the exception. I t  views law as something that must issue from an
ineffable or unknowable "outside," like the word of  God. The Greek
discourse is that of "the wise man" and "the natural totality," or what in
legal theory we might call natural law. I t  characterizes law as a function
of some identifiable natural order—something any rational creature can
deduce from within any given situation.
The properly Christian or soteriological discourse, Badiou main-
tains, rejects law in  both its exceptional and its normative modes, and
attaches itself exclusively to an event. Badiou writes:
Paul's project is to show that the universal logic of salvation cannot
be reconciled with any law, be it one that ties thought to the cosmos,
or one that fixes the effects of an exceptional election. I t  is impos-
sible that the starting point be the Whole, but just as impossible that
it be an exception to the Whole. Neither totality nor sign will do.
One must proceed from the event as such, which is a-cosmic and il-
legal, refusing integration into any totality and signaling nothing.
But proceeding from the event delivers no law, not form of mastery,
be it that of the wise man or the prophet."
9. Id at 81.
10. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
See Ephesians 2:4-9.
12. HA M M ,  supra note 3, at 41.
13. Id_
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Paul's project speaks to neither fact nor norm, neither exception nor or-
der, but a pure event that transforms all relations and leaves behind no
new arrangement. At  the same time, Badiou is certain to distinguish this
new Christian discourse from any obscurantist or radically individualistic
revelation. I t  is not what Badiou calls a "ravishment of  the unutter-
able,"
14 














































lation. While it is thoroughly dissociated from all law, indeed precisely
because it is dissociated from the law and all established forms of knowl-
edge, the truth-event thoroughly relies on a subject who will declare it,
and declare it publicly.
IV. AGAMBEN'S MESSIANISM
I am not sure I have done a very good job of clarifying Badiou's
work, but perhaps it is time to turn to Agamben, who is undoubtedly bet-
ter known in North America than Badiou, largely because of his theories
of sovereignty and biopower, homo sacer, bare life, and the state of ex-
ception. Agamben is also a very different kind of scholar than Badiou—
more of a reader of texts, especially mysterious, arcane texts, than an
inventor of philosophical or ontological systems. T o  the extent that we
can say Agamben has a "politics," it would be very different from Ba-
diou's as well—less a call for militancy and statement of  axiomatic
truths than a kind of studied, phlegmatic, stoical reserve, in line I sup-
pose with Bartleby's famous "I would prefer not to."
Agamben's approach to Paul is also distinct from Badiou's, al-
t ough they are clearly in conversation with one another on the topic.
While Badiou reads Paul as a militant figure and the foundation of uni-
versalism, Agamben reads him as a messianic thinker, even a philoso-
pher of time. Time is, of course, one of the oldest and most complicated
of philosophical problems—vexing us from at least Aristotle's Physics,
with its loaded metaphor of potentiality and actuality, to Heidegger's
Being and Time, with its rejection of the "series of flows" in favor of an
ecstatic relation of what is no longer and what is still yet to come.
Essentially, Agamben reads Paul as a thinker of "the time that re-
mains" or the hidden time that it takes to think anything at all about time
itself. This "time that remains" is, for Agamben, everywhere present but
everywhere absent. I t  is the presupposed but concealed condition of time
as such. Paul's messianism is not concerned with the apocalyptic "end
of times," but with what Agamben calls the "time of the end." In  short,
to be messianic is not to imagine a certain end to history, but to experi-
nce time in a certain way—as spontaneous creation of the new and met-
14. Id. at 54.
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ancholic loss of the past. I n  terms of political and legal theory, Agam-
ben's book on Paul is somewhat less obtuse. I t  contains two important
elements: (1) a theory of the subject on the one hand; and (2) a theory of
the law on the other. What does it mean to be a person, or more specifi-
cally, a Christian in Paul's sense? And how does a person or a Christian
relate to law?
A. Agamben and the Subject
The Time that Remains is framed as a microscopically close reading
of the opening salutation of Paul's Letter to the Romans, which Agam-
ben renders: "Paul slave of [the] Messiah Jesus called emissary separated
unto [the] announcement of God."
15 E a c h  w o r d  
i s  
a d d r e s s e d  
i n  
e l a b o r a
t e
detail, but the two that seem most significant are "called" (Idetos) and
"separated" (aphorismenos), addressed in the second and third chapters
of Agamben's book respectively. First, what does it mean for Paul to be
"called"? What is a "calling"? Here Agamben takes issue with Max
Weber's well-known interpretation of Paul as someone who understands
a "calling" as a kind of personal vocation coupled with worldly indiffer-
ence—what becomes the "protestant ethic." For  Agamben, the messi-
anic calling to which Paul attests is neither a personal destiny nor a
worldly indifference. I t  is instead a moment, an experience, which situ-
ates the called one immediately in the world. I t  commands the use of
what is available, not the accumulation of possessions.
Second, and more importantly, what does it  mean for Paul, who
proclaims the Christian faith as universal, to say that he has been "sepa-
rated"? What is universal about separation? Agamben's point here is
related to Badiou's reflections on the "singular universal," but it is, none-
theless, considerably more finessed. F or  Badiou, every truth or truth-
event is only universal insofar as it  is supported by a singular subject
who declares it publicly. Agamben, on the other hand, thinks that the
Christian subject is "separated" as a certain excess or incommensurable
element that remains incoherent after every act of separation or every
separation between plural identities. Put simply, whenever humans are
divided into separate categories or identities, there always remain some
humans who fit within none of the established categories. These "sepa-
rated" ones are, for Agamben, the truly universal or messianic subjects—
the ones whose proper place is no place at all. The paradigmatic exam-
ple is the young Marx's conception of the proletariat, who are not an
15. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE TIME THAT REMAINS: A  COMMENTARY ON THE LETTER TO THE
ROMANS 149 (Patricia Dailey trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2005) (2000).
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identifiable economic "class," but precisely those who fit within no clas-
sification or who remain separate after every act of classification.
It is on this later point—the messianic subject as the remains, the
remnant, o r the separated—that Agamben stakes the political signifi-
cance of Paul's letters. He  writes:
I f  I had to mark out a political legacy in Paul's letters that was im-
mediately traceable, I believe that the concept of the remnant would
have to play a part. More  specifically, it allows for a new perspec-
tive that dislodges our antiquated notions of a people and a democ-
racy, however impossible it may be to completely renounce them.
The people is neither the all nor the part, neither the majority nor
the minority. Instead, it is that which can never coincide with itself,
as all or as part, that which infinitely remains or resists in each divi-
sion, and, with all due respect to those who govern us, never allows
us to be reduced to a majority or a minority. Th is remnant is the
figure, or the substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive mo-
ment, and as such is the only real political subject.
16To simplify Agamben's point, "the people" is never something that
can be quantified or divided into majority and minority for the purposes
of calculation and regulation. " Th e  people" is only that which acts in
what Agamben calls "a decisive moment." I  am sure that some o f  us
hear in this passage strains o f  mass democracy, revolutionary workers'
councils, and the constituent power o f  the multitude. B u t  I  don't think
that is what Agamben has in mind.
B. Agamben and the Law
It is here that Agamben's reading of Paul's antinomialism becomes
informative. Badiou's analysis of Paul's antinomialism is, we will recall,
fairly cut and dried: law is the figure of death; grace is the figure of life.
Grace abounds as an alternative to law. I t  wipes clean our need for the
law. Agamben, on the other hand, tries to take seriously Paul's cla im
that the Christ-event both completes and transcends, both fulfills and de-
stroys, the law. There is actually a moment in The Time that Remains
where Agamben tries to prove that the Hegelian Aulhebung, or the notion
that something might be cancelled out and preserved at a higher level, is
directly derived from Hegel's reading o f  Martin Luther's translation o f
Paul's word katargesis, which means to abolish, preserve, and fu lfill.
Whether or not we wish to accept this textual assertion, it  does get us
closer to what Agamben wants to say about law. Fo r Agamben's messi-
16. M  at 57.
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anic tendency suggests, not that we can do away with law as such, but
that, in treating law as a pure means, rather than an instrumental means
to an end, we might preserve it while rendering it inoperative—preserve,
we might say, the "form" of law without its force or its content.
Perhaps this aspect o f  Agamben's juridical thought is most suc-
cinctly explained in a different text, namely State of Exception, where we
find the following messianic prophesy: "One day," Agamben proclaims
there, "humanity wil l  play with law just as children play with  disused
objects, not in  order to restore them to their canonical use, but to free
them from it for good. What is found after the law," he continues, "is not
a more proper and original use value that precedes the law, but a new use
that is only born after it . "
1 7  H e r e  
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between violence and law,"  as Agamben says, and imagine instead a
"pure' law [. 1  that does not bind, that neither commands nor prohibits
anythin , but says only itself." Such a pure law would "correspond [to]














































tology o f potentiality" that was not "founded on the primacy o f actuality
and its relation to potentiality."
19 Paul's antinomial, messianic promise, then, is o f  a law hollowed
out o f  its force and its violence, separated from its punitive function.
Instead, the law is the object o f  infinite, almost infantile play without
purpose or aim—a pure potentiality or "means without end," as Agam-
ben puts it  in the title o f  another one o f  his works. Here  we find, not a
break with nor a breaking o f the law, but rather the law's recapitulation
or repetition, almost a parodic reiteration a  doubling that also annuls its
strength and severs its ancient link with violence and force. Agamben's
privileged examples o f  such a messianic experience o f  the law in  our
existing world come from religious festivals: carnivals and feasts, holi-
days and bacchanalia, where the generic forms o f  law remain in  place
while the content is scrambled and destroyed.
This explains the simplest but most far reaching difference between
Badiou's and Agamben's respective appropriations o f  Saint Paul—the
universalism o f  one and the messianism o f  the other. F o r  i f  Badiou is
utterly serious, demanding militant fidelity to an event and the public
statement of axiomatic truths, Agamben is sufficiently melancholic about
17. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 64 (Kev in Attel l  trans., Stanford Univ . Press
2005)(2003).
18. M  at 88.
19_ GIORGIO AGAMBEN, Homo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 43 (Daniel Hel ler-
Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998)(1995).
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the present to imagine the possibility of careless joy in the future, or in a
certain futurity that conditions every now, provided we attend to the call-
ing without vocation and acknowledge the promise of grace.
V. ARENDT'S REPUBLICANISM
An alternative approach to Paul's epistles might be found in Ar-
endt's far more occasional, but I  think more insightful, references to
them in her work. For Arendt, Paul is the thinker who first discovers the
will, which is a kind of capricious and uncontrollable arbiter that stands
between intention and action, or what I want to do and what I actually
do—the "split subject" of psychoanalysis. I n  Arendt's estimation, it is
this private, internal faculty that our intellectual tradition, or the Christian
intellectual tradition at any rate, comes to associate with freedom, for it
seems to be constrained by neither a desire that comes before it nor a
goal that it seeks to accomplish. Without purpose or aim, the will simply
decides.
At the same time, Arendt continues, this means that Paul discovers
the will in its impotence, or its inability to alter the world and engage
with the plurality of human others. For its freedom relies on its purity. I t
cannot be tainted by any difference, and it cannot be subjected to any
law, without ceasing to be, precisely, a will. That such a solitary, inter-
nal, impotent faculty would become the basis for our conception of legal
and political freedom is, for Arendt, one of the greatest mysteries and
one of  the greatest tragedies o f  all human experience. What  speaks
properly to the agony of being a human individual alone with oneself,
Arendt continues, or what speaks properly to the complexity of attempt-
ing to be in agreement with oneself, somehow becomes the standard for
our relations with others—as i f  the plurality of human affairs could be
reduced to the non-contradictory purity of a human will.
Here, then, Paul's antinomialism makes perfect sense as a private
experience or as an effort to suspend the law when relating to oneself,
but it makes no sense at all as a political mandate. F or  in the public
world, humans are never unified around a "general will"; rather, and as
the French verb partager captures quite well, they share what divides
them. Arendt's favorite metaphor for this sharing and dividing is the
table, which brings us together around the very thing that holds us apart.
Perhaps law in the sense of nomos is also such a sharing and divid-
ing, such a common coming together for the sake of being taken apart.
For the plurality of human affairs relies, not on an event that speaks the
truth, but on the endless fictions, fantasies, and illusions that we generate
as ways of bridging, however briefly and however tendentiously, the inc-
ommensurable differences that separate us.
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